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Assessing the ThirdTransitionin LatinAmerican
Democratization
Representational
RegimesandCivil Societyin Argentinaand
Brazil
Elisabeth Jay Friedmanand KathrynHochstetler

In the last two decadesmost LatinAmericancountrieshave made the politicaltransition
to formal liberal democracy.With a few notable exceptions,the threatof authoritarian
reversalshas diminished.But althoughdemocraticstabilitydoes not seem to be imminently imperiled,the quality of the democraciesin the region often seems quite low.
Instead of consolidated democracies, observers have found "hybrid"or "delegative"
In orderto ensure
regimes,run on the principlesof"neopopulism"and "neopluralism."I
anothertransition,the economic transitionfrom state-ledto market-driveneconomies,
presidentsare ignoring legislative and judicial branches,their own parties, and many
interestgroups.As a result of these developments,analystsare increasinglyusing the
of politicalinteractionas the litmustest of democraticconsolidation.
institutionalization
This article continues this concern with the quality of democracy and the institutionalizationof political interactionsbut turns from issues of decision making to theorize about developments in the arena of representation,particularlycivil society.
Under pressure from the economic transition, traditionalinstitutions of representation, including corporatistunions and political parties, seem to be in transformation,
if not decay.2As these institutions lose their legitimacy, there is a search for others,
such as social movements, nongovernmental organizations, and "associative networks,"to replace or augmentthem.3Indeed,analysts claim that an "institutionalized
civil society" is an arenain which to assess the institutionalizationand consolidation
of regional democracies.4The ongoing transformationof civil society is a potential
third transitionin Latin America and other transitionalregions, as importantas the
often concurrentand mutually constitutive political move from military to civilian
rule and the economic turnto market-orientedeconomies.
This analysisdepartsfromthe classic definitionof civil society as the realm of associative life separatefromthe family,the state, and the market.5Civil society is instantiated by actors like social movements,interestgroups, nongovernmentalorganizations,
21
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and othernoneconomic,nonstateactorswho are quite diversein theirmodes of organization and their goals. As a group, they can be called civil society organizations.
Defining the subjectin this way allows more systematicinvestigationof the natureof
their relations with state-based actors and political society, especially importantin
assessingthe qualityof democratization,and with economic actorslike businessassociationsand unions.To examinehow developmentsin the civil society arenaarelinkedto
processes of democratizationand economic liberalization,the conceptualterritoryof
democraticrepresentational
regimes will first be defined and mappedout.A comparative case studyof civil society in Argentinaand Brazilwill then assess the consequences
of differentrepresentational
regimesfor the qualityof LatinAmericandemocracies.

Representational Regimes
Representation is important in any democratic regime because it relates the
expressed preferences of the ruled with the choices and policies of the rulers. Civil
society organizations,like parties and unions, help link citizens and leaders for the
purpose of representation.The frameworkpresentedhere could be used to assess the
evolving nature of representation for the other linking actors as well, and a full
understandingof current representationalregimes in Argentina and Brazil would
have to include such actors, althoughthe characterizationof the regime might be different for them. Due to limitationsof space, it will be applied initially to a comparatively overlookedset of mediatingactors, civil society organizations.
All of the four representationalregimes discussed here are compatiblewith the
minimal or electoralform of democracy,so democracyis one partof theirnames (see
Table 1). The need for qualifiers indicates that electoral mechanisms alone do not
account for differentkinds of representation,and these qualifiers in turnsubstantially
alter the quality of the democracyin question. The four representationalregimes are
categorizedalong two axes, by their dominantactor and their degree of institutionalization of civil society organizations'access to state actors. Representationalmechanisms such as corporatismhave long been classified by whether they are organized
from the top down (within the state) or bottom up (within society). However, the
Table 1 FourRepresentationalRegimes
Level of
Institutionalization
DominantActor

Low

High

Society

Adversarial
democracy

Deliberative
democracy

State

Delegativedemocracy

Cooptivedemocracy
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study of democratizingcountriesbrings anotherconsiderationto the fore: the degree
of institutionalization.Institutionalizedmechanisms of representationreduce the levels of uncertaintyand arbitrarinessfor potentialparticipants.
Adversarialdemocracy is a representationalregime that, while organizedby societal actors from the bottom up, has relatively low levels of institutionalization.6
Citizens are not controlled by state actors, but neither are they assured a regular
channel of access to political decision making. In addition,the state does not protect
weaker civil society actors against stronger ones. For example, representation
throughclientelistic networks depends largely on citizens' trade of political support
for favors from highly placed elites, who are not institutionallybound to represent
them. Both pluralismand neopluralismare placed in this category.7
While there are dangers associated with a lack of institutionalizationwhen society is in charge, even less representationis ensured when low institutionalizationis
coupled with state control of state-society relations. Delegative democracy is a
democracy in which state actors are selected democraticallybut run roughshod over
other political institutions.8 Of particular concern is executives' ability largely to
ignore representativeorganizations,from interest groups to parties to the legislative
branch itself. Only the interests of the people as perceived by top state actors are
taken into account, often with only plebiscitary or even no consultation.Examples of
delegative democracy include populist types of authorityrelations where mobilization from the top down is largely intended to support a leader and does not depend
on institutionalor autonomousforms of representation.9
High levels of state control coupled with high levels of institutionalizedparticipation produce cooptive democracy.Citizens have access to government elites, but in
ways establishedand maintainedby those elites. Farfrom ignoring civil society, state
actors seek to coopt or repress autonomous civil organization. Civil society actors
may approachthe state, but only by obeying its participatoryrules. This representational regime shows clearly that even inclusive institutionalizationin and of itself
does not enhance the quality of democracy.In Latin America the classic example of
such a cooptive democracy is state corporatism, where control and initiative over
corporatistarrangementsare exerted from the top down by the state.10
Finally, in deliberative democracy,state actors facilitate social and political dialogue that is broadly equitable and inclusive, that is regularly engaged in, and that
carries weight in elite decision-making processes. Political theorists are currently
delineating the preconditions and promise of such an approach.11Their efforts partially fill the gap left by the paucity of historical experiences with deliberative
democracy, especially in Latin America. Modes of representationsuch as societal
corporatism,prominentin western Europe and distinguished from state corporatism
by its greaterimpetus from societal actors, approximatesome aspects of deliberative
democracybut fall short of the theoreticalideals.
How do these representationalregimes condition civil society? An emerging con23
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Table 2 Dimensions of Civil Society Organizationsin Four Representational
Regimes
Representational Adversarial
Regime democracy

Delegative
democracy

Cooptive
democracy

Deliberative
democracy

Dimensionsof

CSOs
Political
opportunity

Open;eliteprivileging

Arbitrary;
dependenton

Mobilizing
structures

Varied;
competitive

Included:weak
Included:
Varied;
institutionalizationinstitutionalized cooperative

structures

Frames

leader

Regulatedby state Open;regularand
or closed
access
egalitarian

Excluded:
protest? Excluded:
protest

Individualistic;Individualistic;
Competingmaster Sharedmaster
frames:pro-state frames
issue-specific issue-specific
frames
framesor anti-state andanti-state

master
frame
sensus stresses the importance of three related factors in understandingthe origin
and development of social movements.12Political opportunities (and constraints)
emerge in the relations between civil society organizations and external political
actors and institutions. Civil society organizations organize their own activities
throughmobilizing structures.Mobilizing structuresmay range from friendshipnetworks to highly structuredpermanentorganizations.Finally, civil society organizations shape sharedconceptions of problems and solutions and of their own identities
through framing processes. Frames draw attention to the role of ideas and understandings in social movement mobilizations. Master frames lie at a higher level of
abstraction and allow related movements to see themselves as part of a common
struggle.Table2 summarizesthe relationshipof these three dimensionsof civil society organizationsto the four representationalregimes.
The political opportunitystructureof adversarialdemocracyis characterizedby a
relativehands-offapproachby state institutionsand actors,who do not try to directthe
number,type, and goals of civil society organizations.Interestmediationis moread hoc
thanregularized.Thus, the political opportunitiescharacterizingadversarialdemocracy
will be more open to the influenceof multiplecivil society organizations,but may easily privilege those representingelite interests. With respect to mobilizing structures,
adversarialdemocracywill not lead to predictableorganizationalstructuresamongcivil
society actors.They might in fact fostercompetitionratherthancooperationamongdifferentkinds of groups, given thatthereis a relativelyopen marketplacefor the expression of interests.Not surprisingly,the orientationof mobilizing structureswill often be
24
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gearedto the organizations'abilityto generatethe funds,training,and access necessary
to achieve a high profile and garnerpolitical access. Finally,the framingprocesses of
adversarialdemocracywill be focused more on the common points of reference of a
specific set of groups than on a multisectoralvision. Adversarialdemocracydoes not
presentan incentivestructurefor groupsto develop sharedidentitiesthatwill bind them
into stable networks.Therefore,civil society organizationswill be less able to achieve
goals beyondinfluenceon specific policy issues.
In delegative democracypolitical opportunitieswill be arbitraryand will depend
almost entirely on the actions of populist leaders. Individualrelationshipswill be of
considerable importance.Those ignored by political leaders will have little institutional recourse,whetherpolitical or judicial. The mobilizing structuresunder delegative democracy will differ for the sectors that leaders seek as supportersand those
they exclude. Leaders may well direct resources toward supporters'organizations,
though institutionalizationwill remainweak. The sectors that are excluded may seek
alliances to protest their exclusion but will find organizational solutions. to their
predicament difficult to coordinate. Finally, the framing processes of civil society
organizationsunder delegative democracy will repeat the pattern under adversarial
democracy: temporary formulation of understandings around particular issues.
However, given the exclusion common to many sectors, protest against arbitrary
governmentmay become a common frame.
In cooptive democraciesthe state will provide differentkinds of access for different sectors of civil society, with participatorymechanisms established for some and
repression for others. State actors will strongly control the scope and form of the
access of even those civil society organizationsthat have direct access to decision
making. These arrangements are generally institutionalized beyond the tenure of
individual administrations.Cooptive democratic arrangementswill favor different
mobilizing structuresfor included and excluded civil society organizations.Special
state resources and access for favored organizationswill supportrelatively complex
organizationalstructures,while the dependence on state resources orients the organizations to conventionalopportunitiesfor collective action. Among excluded groups,
the rigidity and selective inclusion associated with cooptive democracy may spur
new protest movements. Civil society organizations in cooptive democracy will
develop shared frames stressing the central role of the state in framing collective
problems and solutions. As in delegative democracy,excluded actors may also join
together within a master frame in demanding broaderparticipation,although their
frames could also be fragmentedand individualistic.
Finally, in deliberativedemocracythe political opportunitystructurewill be both
systematicallyopen to civil society organizationsand susceptible to their reformulation. The state will also mediate the interactionsof different sectors of civil society
to assure their equitableand uncoercedparticipation.Mobilizing structureswill vary
25
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in deliberative democracy because many different kinds of participation will be
assuredthroughthe open and equitablepolitical opportunitystructure.The voices of
experts and less conventional kinds of political actors will be heard. Mobilizing
structureswill depend more on the preferences of the organizationsthemselves than
on state-drivenforms. Finally,framingprocesses are centralto deliberativedemocracy. Continuous open dialogue that respects many kinds of participantswill produce
broader understandingsof issues. Proponents of deliberativedemocracy argue that
participantswill be transformedthroughtheir dialogues and reorientedto thinkingin
collective ratherthan in individualterms.

Research Design and Methodology
The concept of representationalregime will be applied througha structured,focused
comparison of two Latin American countries that have recently undergonethe three
transitions:Brazil and Argentina. Under Vargas and Per6n, respectively,these two
countries developed the representationalregime of cooptive democracy known as
state corporatism.In the 1960s their military governmentsheavily restricteddemocratic representation. Now their representational regimes are again changing. To
assess this change, the three factors identified above as central to the origin and
development of contemporarycivil society organizations-political opportunities,
mobilizing structures,and framingprocesses-will be analyzed.
The general approachof this article is historical institutionalism.In particular,it
begins with the premise that institutionsof interestrepresentationstructurethe preferences and strategiesof the actors within them. In addition,historical institutionalism assumes a stickiness of institutionalarrangementsthat helps set trajectoriesfor
futurepolitical choices and arrangements.Thus, the past experiences of interestrepresentation in these two cases should have an impact on current representational
regimes, although "political choices, strategies, and contingencies remain central
determinantsof social and economic processes, and theirmeaning and consequences
perhaps gain even greater relevance in a conjunctureof deep economic crises and
transformations."13Although many institutional approaches do not give adequate
attentionto the centralframingprocesses that help nonstate actors interpretand constructtheir alternativecourses of action, they are consideredimportanthere.
Brazil
The Brazilian transition from military to civilian rule developed gradually and
unevenly. Elections and parties were constrained throughout the military period.
26
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Significant opposition victories began in 1974. Some elements of the transitionare
still incomplete, and the new democracy suffers from significant failings.14The economic transitionalso proceeded in fits and starts. Comprehensiveneoliberal reforms
began only in 1994. Not surprisingly,civil society also shows signs of both progress
and regression, althoughthe degree of institutionalizationof state-society relations is
high in Brazil comparedto both Argentinaand other aspects of Brazilianpolitics.
New political opportunitiesopened during the final years of the military regime.
Politicians from the parties in opposition to the military were elected to subnational
positions even before control of the national executive passed into civilian hands in
1985. From their new positions they extended participatoryinvitations to their former allies in civil society organizations.The WorkersParty (PT) was especially committed to creating popular councils where civil society organizationscould directly
join in policymaking and implementation, but other parties also joined in the
effort.15The 1988 national constitution and subsequent lower level constitutions
requiredcouncils that included civil society organizationsto orient policy in a variety of issue areas. By the 1990s the proliferation of councils led to what Alvarez
calls "council democracy"in Brazil.16There are at least eighty-four national councils, and thousands of lower level councils across the country.17One estimate suggests that there are 1,167 councils on social issues operatingin the state of Sao Paulo
alone.18These councils are difficult to characterizeas a group. Some are made up of
appointedmembers,which often limits participation.Othersallow civil society organizations to select their own representativesto the councils. On paper, many of the
councils have significant decision-making and/or executive authority, which is
shared unequally with their civil society participants. Civil society organizations
have pushed to make the councils and their own roles within them more powerful
and even share the leadershiprole with state actors in the councils-on children and
adolescents (Conanda)and social assistance (CNAS).19
Withoutdoubt, Brazil's council democracypresents unusually extensive and institutionalized opportunities for political participation. Less clear is whether these
institutionalizedopportunitiesare best understoodas instances of cooptive democracy or as rare examples of deliberativedemocracy. Hoping they would be the latter,
civil society organizations in many cases requested such councils. Nonetheless,
councils are currentlyarenasof struggle over exactly this issue. The struggle is especially intense in the social councils, where civil society organizations deliberately
push an extensive agenda that runs directly counter to the neoliberal spending plans
of the national executive. In this struggle state actors hold many advantages over
civil society actors. They use their control over resources to punish and rewardcivil
society organizations and simply try to ignore these fora if they will not rubber
stamp the government's preferred policies.20 Civil society organizations have
responded by trying to mobilize their bases and by capitalizing on the basic representational advance of the councils. Even if governments do not want to listen, the
27
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councils are a new space for civil society organizations to speak publicly and to
deliberatewith each other.
Otherparticipatoryopportunitieshave been more episodic. Largenumbersof civil
society organizations mobilized to influence the new federal constitution. Several
large nongovernmentalorganizationsset up operationsin Brasilia duringthe deliberations, coordinating a far-flung network of civil society organizations called the
Plenary for Popular Participation in the Constituent Assembly. The Plenary for
Popular Participation lost several early battles over the format of the constituent
assembly but gained the opportunityto present popularamendmentsto the constitutional drafts.21Civil society organizationscollected over six million signaturesfor
amendmentsabout economic inclusion and nearly five million for rights of various
kinds.22Some of these proposals were included in the constitution,while othercherished amendments,like agrarianreform,were not. A similaropportunityfor influence
and debate emerged just a few years later, when Brazil hosted the 1992 United
Nations Conferenceon Environmentand Development(UNCED). Civil society organizations again createda broad cross-sectoralcoalition of over 1,200 organizationsin
the Forumof BrazilianNongovernmentalOrganizations,which both developedtheir
own civil society positions on the conference issues and tried to influence their government'spositions. The Forumheld eight national"encounters"to plan theirparticipation before hosting a global nongovernmentalforum parallel to the governmental
summit.23Some of the same large organizationsthat helped to coordinatethe Plenary
for Popular Participation also sat on the national coordinating committee of the
Forumand created an ongoing umbrellaorganizationof nongovernmentalorganizations called the BrazilianAssociation of NongovernmentalOrganizations(Abong) in
1991.24The constituent assembly and UNCED mobilizations were most similar to
adversarialor even deliberativeforumsof interestrepresentation;civil society organizations chartedmuch of their own course for theirparticipation.
During the first decade of civilian politics in Brazil opportunitiesfor civil society
organizationswere scatteredacross the numerouscouncils and the occasional larger
mobilizing opportunities.Governmentattentionwas focused primarilyon the continuing economic crisis, and no national administrationattemptedto thinkmore broadly about the emerging civil society organizationsand their political role. Despite a
series of economic shock packages, staggeringinflation rates of nearly2,500 percent
in 1993 persisted alongside sluggish growth (-0.7 percent for 1981-1990 and 1.2
percent for 1991-1996), lower real wages from 1990 to 1995, and continuingunemployment.25Excluded from economic decision making and alarmed at rising levels
of violence, a broad arrayof civil society organizationstook to the streetsin protest
against increasing poverty and hunger. Ironically, an important new opportunity
emerged for civil society organizations only after FernandoHenrique Cardoso, as
finance minister, tamed inflation with Brazil's fullest neoliberal reforms in 1994,
without addressingany of their other concerns.
28
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Brazil's nongovernmentalorganizationshave received major funding from international sources; $400 million went annually to 5,500 Brazilian nongovernmental
organizationsin the mid 1990s. As Cardoso'snew antiinflationpolicies succeeded,
the dollar'svalue droppedsharply,and 86 percent of nongovernmentalorganizations
had to cut employees and programs.26After Cardoso was elected president,Abong
met with his transition team to discuss both short-term assistance and possible
longer-term partnershipsbetween nongovernmental organizations and the federal
government.27Cardoso's team decided that the appropriateplace for such ongoing
discussions would be in a new agency within the executive branch called the
Solidary Community(CS). The CS was in some ways the institutionalsuccessor of
the previous president'sNational Council on Food Security. It was led by the first
lady, Ruth Cardoso, as is typical of Latin American social programs, and is partly
orientedtowardthe alleviation of poverty.
However, most Latin American first ladies are not anthropologyprofessors and
long-term scholars of social movements, as Ruth Cardosois.28Her influence is most
notable in the Council of the Solidary Community (CCS). The CCS took nearly
eighteen months to settle on a mission, while civil society organizations,including
Abong, heavily criticized the CS as a clientelistic effort to distractattentionfrom the
ways Cardoso's administrationwas gutting social programs.29The CCS eventually
defined a three part mission: strengtheningcivil society, forming new social development partnershipsbetween the state and civil society, and maintainingsystematic
high-level dialogue between governmental and nongovernmental actors on social
issues.30A major mechanism was a series of discussions that tried to make concrete
consensual proposals among invited governmental and nongovernmental participants. Eight of these political interlocutions (interlocupdespoliticas) have covered
topics ranging from agrarian reform to integrated local development.31The CCS
itself can be considered a major new opportunityfor civil society organizationsto
participate in a deliberative problem-solving forum. Its defenders see it as wholly
innovativeand positive. They insist that the CCS is truly a space somewherebetween
the governmentaland nongovernmental,that its "publicization"of problem solving
is a necessary counterpartto neoliberal privatization,and that it breaks with all old
conceptions of representationby inviting individual participantswho do not represent their organizations,their sectors, or their governmentalagencies but instead represent importantideas.32Few outside the CCS itself are preparedto grant it all these
claims, but civil society organizationshave been willing to engage in the political
interlocutionswith varying concreteresults.
One recent result is a law that addresses some of the concerns of Abong and other
civil society organizations about reshaping relations between them and the state.
This law was largely draftedin a CCS interlocutionprocess in 1997 and 1998, with
about $8 million in funding from the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank for early
stages of the debates and the participationof various civil society actors.33The fed29
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eral executive presented the law to the congress in July 1998, which passed it in
March 1999. The law updates the previous legislation from the 1950s by creatinga
new legal category,the Civil Society Organizationof Public Interest(OSCIP),and a
new mechanism for funding such agencies, the partnership(parceria). Despite its
lengthy and deliberativegenesis, the law has been largely stillborn.A year afterpassage, while 192 organizations (a tiny fraction of those eligible) had applied for
OSCIP status, only eighteen were approved.34The ministryof justice found statutory
irregularitiesin most of the rejected organizations,partly because some clauses in
the new legislation were inconsistent with the tax code.35 In addition, no partnerships have been established,confirming the skepticism of civil society organizations
about forthcoming resources. Federal economic agencies, in fact, resisted the creation of tax deductions for contributionsto OSCIPs, despite the civil society organizations' requests, and consistently refused to guarantee funding for partnerships.36
The Brazilian nonprofit sector received about 15.5 percent of its funding from the
public sector in 1995, well below the global average of 40.1 percent.37In light of
these problems,the small numberof OSCIPs is not surprising.
Some opportunitiesconsistent with adversarialdemocracy exist with respect to
the national congress. Formally,there are few restrictionson lobbying and attempts
to influence congress. Nonetheless, the weakness of both the party system and the
congress itself have made them a secondary arena for most civil society organizations.38 The congress has been especially weak in economic policymaking.
Executives have made economic policy largely without it.
Finally,diverse internationalactors have both providednew opportunitiesfor civil
society organizations and channeled their activities in particular ways. The most
direct impacts have come from the funding that internationalactors have given to
Brazilian civil society organizations;170 differentinternationalinstitutionsprovided
83 percent of the total funding to Abong's member associations in 1993.39Other
impacts are less direct. They include the reorganizationand renaming of recipient
organizations as nongovernmental organizations rather than other kinds of social
organizations40and the adoption of new substantive discourses, as in the turn by
indigenous and rubbertapperassociations in the Amazon to an environmentaldiscourse in the 1980s.41Internationalactors have also been an importantsupportfor
many Brazilian civil society organization campaigns and mobilizations, on topics
rangingfrom the Amazon to humanrights to streetchildren.
Nongovernmentalorganizationshave become an importantmobilizing structurefor
civil society organizationssince 1985. A leading Brazilianscholar (and employee)of
nongovernmentalorganizations,Leilah Landim,characterizesthem as "a group of the
most modern and recent organizationsin our history, professionalized and secular,
where world-viewsand activitiesgo in the directionof promotingcitizenship,equality,
and democracy."42
Many definitionsof nongovernmentalorganizationsstressonly their

30
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professionaland organizationalqualities.In contrastto social movements,they are less
spontaneousand tend to more conventionaland apoliticalkinds of participation,based
on special skills and expertise.Braziliannongovernmentalorganizations,however,tend
to be more engagedwith franklypoliticaland unconventionalorganizationsand to participatemore in protestmobilizationsthantheir counterpartsin othercountriessuch as
Argentina.In Brazil the same broadand diverse coalitionthat mobilized to lobby professionally at the constituentassembly and the UNCED conference also organizeda
million people to march for the impeachmentof president Collor in 1993 and then
launcheda largecampaignagainsthungerand violence.43
More traditionalsocial movements also continue in large numbers as part of the
mobilizing structure.They have lost some visibility with the rise of nongovernmental organizationsbut, as Sonia Alvarez notes, they are always there for an observer
who knows where to look for them and are as active as ever, with smaller demonstrations, numerousgatherings,and clear positions on the issues of the day.44Because of
their precarious organizational structure, they often can not move quickly and
expertly enough to compete with nongovernmentalorganizations for state-defined
opportunities.But they have been a critical part of the civil society organizationnetworks in Brazil since the 1970s, swelling the numbers for protests and lobbying,
contributingideas, and pursuing their self-defined ends. A few social movements,
notablythe Landless Movement (MST), have played even more visible roles, protesting ongoing inequalityin land ownershipand the neoliberal state'seconomic agenda.
For Brazilian civil society organizations, the mobilizing frame since 1985 has
been citizenship.45This master frame goes well beyond the political meaning of citizenship to social and economic inclusion as central indicators of its presence.
Citizenship, as used by Brazilian civil society organizations,is a social justice rights
claim. Civil society organizations claim citizenship for themselves, and they use
their access to the political system to push for citizenship for groups that continue to
be excluded. This frame has provento be remarkablyadaptable,motivatingall of the
mobilizations discussed above. First articulated during the constituent assembly
mobilizations which marked the political transition, this conception of citizenship
was equally appropriatefor civil society's responses to the second, economic transition.46 The antihunger campaigns of 1993 and 1994 called themselves Action of
Citizenship against Hunger,Misery and for Life. The frame has also helped establish
links to a part of the business community that is committed to both economic prosperity and social justice. The citizenship frame is obviously both broad and compelling enough to sustain national links within civil society over quite long periods
of time. As the concept is defined in Brazil, it also necessarily links all three sectors:
state, economy, and civil society. It is a deliberative democracy frame that can not
easily be turnedto supportingstate control over representation,since its emphasis is
on equitableparticipationand inclusion.

31
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Argentina
The Argentinetransitionto democracyhappenedmuch faster than the Brazilian.The
authoritarian"dirty war" (1976-1983), in which tens of thousands of Argentines
were killed or disappeared, ended after the external shock of Argentine military
defeat in the Falkland/Malvinaswar galvanized the opposition in the early 1980s.47
The October 1983 elections heraldedthe end of the military dictatorship.A turnover
in power from one civilian governmentto anothertook place in the second national
election in 1989, though somewhat ahead of schedule. Radical Party leader Rauil
Alfonsin resigned six months before the end of his term because of his failure to
curbhyperinflation.48In response, PeronistCarlos Menem began neoliberaleconomic reform upon taking office. Although there was a time lag between the political
and economic transitions,the thirdtransitionof civil society had a rocky startbefore
the neoliberal transformationand has been deeply affected by it. The degree of institutionalizationof state-society relationstoday,while evolving, is relativelylow.
Social movement activity,particularlyof the humanrights groups that spearheaded the opposition to authoritarianism,marked the political transitionof the 1980s.
Whereasthe rejected Peronistpresidentialcandidatehad ties to the military,the winning Radical candidate,Alfonsin, explicitly affirmed human rights and rejectedthe
military'sattemptto declare a self-amnesty.49In a weighty symbolic move, he adopted the slogan "we are life" from the Mothersof the Plaza de Mayo, the most famous
of the human rights groups that fought against the military regime.50Thus, the transition was guided by a humanrights framedeveloped by the most symbolicallypowerful element of the opposition.
Human rights organizations pressed the new democratic regime to address its
central claims for the rule of law and justice.51A civilian commission was established to look into humanrights violations. Eventually,nine members of the military
junta were tried; five were found guilty; and two were imprisonedfor life. All others
were absolved through military trials. Despite enormous protests, the government
passed the final stop and due obedience laws to restrict trials to only the highestranking officers by mid 1987.52The threatof military rebellion continuedto affect
the opportunitiesextended to the humanrights movement.National and international
protestsnotwithstanding,Menem issued a general pardonin 1990.
The impact of a political opportunitystructureincreasinglyclosed to the demands
of the human rights movement was destructive.Failing to achieve its centralgoals,
the movement split over whether to work in or outside of the system.53The mothers
themselves divided, particularlyover the issue of identifying cadaversand abducted
The organizationalstrengthof other civil society organizationswas
grandchildren.54
the
sapped by
growing economic crisis.55Participationin civil society organizations
declined from 35 to 19 percent of the adultpopulationbetween 1984 and 1991.56
32
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The economic transition heralded a new phase in civil society organizing. The
economic reforms startedin 1989 and crystallized in the convertibilityplan of 1991
were focused on definitively opening the internal market to private investment and
promoting exports.57They called for reduction in state support for economic development and social welfare. Supportivepolitical reforms, grantingthe presidentmore
decree power and promotingdecentralization,were also included.Although reducing
state involvement in economic (and political) life could be seen as providing opportunities consistent with adversarialdemocracy,executive power and decentralization
have often produced delegative results, even after Menem's decretismo gave way to
Radical president Fernandode la Rua's more conciliatory attitude.58In particular,
relations between civil society organizationsand the state seem to depend more on
the whims of administrationsthan on institutionalized frameworks. However, the
response of the judiciary to the demands of civil society organizations,particularly
in recent human rights cases, shows that some degree of institutionalizeddeliberation may be evolving. Such opportunitiescan be seen in several examples.
A subsecretariatfor humanrights, part of the ministry of the interior,was created
in 1984. It has collaboratedproductivelywith particularhuman rights groups.59But
under Menem's watch it switched from the investigationof specific violations to the
promotion of rights education. This more hands-off approach was reinforced by
decentralized(provincial)state contactwith civil society organizations.
Menem also createdthe National Women'sCouncil (CNM), upgradingthe previous national women's agency, in 1992. Its mandate is to oversee the national fulfillment of the U.N. Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against
Women and to promote public policy to ensure gender equality. However, during
Menem's administrationthe CNM had strainedrelations with feminist civil society
organizations,particularlydue to the CNM's supportfor the Catholic church'sposition on reproductiverights. Some nongovernmentalorganizations claimed that the
CNM channeled grant monies from international institutions only to government
supporters.60With the change of administrationto de la Rua, the CNM was almost
closed. After supporterslobbied hard,it was reinstated,though with a shrunkenbudget from overall administrativereductions. New leaders prioritized links with civil
society organizations.
In 1995 an executive branchoffice was establishedto mediate between civil society organizationsand the state. The National Center for Community Organizations
(CENOC) began as part of the Presidency's Secretariatfor Social Development. Its
purpose is to help civil society organizationsplay a greaterrole in the development
of social policy. Its methods include the articulationof links among the state, civil
society, and the market and the promotion of civil society organizationnetworking
and development. One of its central tasks is to keep a data base of organizations.
Although it helps civil society organizationsconnect with funders, the former direc33
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tor of CENOC made clear that it deliberatelyavoided compulsoryregistrationor distributionof state monies to avoid the possibility of clientelism.61With the change of
administration,CENOC'sbudget was cut, and a new directorwithout a civil society
backgroundwas appointed.As a result of the confusion in CENOC's shifting mandate, the provincial network of nongovernmentalorganizationsfelt cut off from the
capital.62
Although in a similar institutional position, CENOC differs from the Brazilian
CS in two crucial ways. First, it was established not throughnegotiationswith civil
society organizations, but at the suggestion of the wife of the then head of the
Secretariatfor Social Development. Its uncertain fate may be due to the top-down
natureof its creation. Second, it has not made state-civil society dialoguesa key part
of its program.It has served more as an informationconduit for civil society organizations.
Another opportunity on the legislative end was the Subcommission on
NongovernmentalOrganizations,subsequently integratedinto the lower chamber's
Commission of Mutual Societies, Cooperatives, and Nongovernmental
Organizations.It was started in 1998 by Peronist deputy Mario Cafiero, due again
not to civil society pressure but to his recognition of the growth of the civil society
organizationsector in the 1990s.63The subcommission first proposed legislation to
regulate nongovernmentalorganizationsthat wished to use public funds, including
those distributedfrom internationalfinancial institutions,voluntary labor,and nonprofit tax liabilities and benefits. In countrywidemeetings it found that,while many
civil society organizationswere anxious for legal status, some challengedstate regulation of voluntaryservice or access to funding.
This legislation faced intense competition with otherproposed laws on civil society organizations in the congress, including one project supported by the World
Bank and the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank (IDB) and other proposalsby the
major parties. Clearly, there is rising interest among legislators in "representing"
civil society. However, a legal consultant who has evaluatedboth the Brazilian and
the Argentine legislation on civil society organizationsconsiders the Argentineboth
comparativelymodest and more controlling than the Brazilian.64At the end of 2000
only the legislation on volunteerswas seriously underconsideration,and it manifested a disposition for state control.65
In adjudicatinga legal action brought by the rights group CELS (see below), a
federaljudge in March 2001 struck down the final stop and due obedience laws as
unconstitutional because they violated international human rights treaties that
Argentinahad signed.66Along with the successful judicial prosecutionof members
of the military who trafficked in the adoption of infants of the disappeared,this ruling indicates the potential for more responsive relations between the judiciary and
civil society.
There is also an internationalaspect to the political opportunitystructure:support
34
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from internationalfinancial institutionsand internationalcivil society organizations.
Both the World Bank and the IDB are heavily involved in funding projects around
second generation reforms, including market-completing measures, distribution
issues such as the alleviation of poverty,and governabilityissues.67They have made
civil society organizations,seen as more efficient service providersthan the state, a
key player.The president of the Social Sector Forum, an organizationof largernongovernmental organizations, credited these internationalfinancial institutions with
forcing the state to engage in dialogue with nongovernmental organizations; the
Forum itself participatedin a civil society organizationassessment project cosponsored by the U.N. Development Programme,the World Bank, and the IDB.68This
form of participation has resulted from "the massive demands of 'northern' civil
society organizations"as well as internationalfinancial institutions'search for effective development.69From academic exchanges, such as the participationof CEDES,
a prominentArgentine thinktank,in a comparativeJohns Hopkins University study
of the third sector, to internationalhumanrights organizations'historical supportfor
domestic actors, such internationalinvolvementmust be taken into account in understanding national civil society organizing. But not all international opportunities
have similar impacts. The channeling of internationalfunds throughthe state allows
for continued state control over civil society. The public share of funding for
Argentine nonprofits was 19.5 percent of their total funding in 1995, slightly above
Brazil's ratio but half the global average.70Much of it is requiredmatching funds for
internationalcontributionsand mandatorysocial welfare payments.71
The mobilizing structuresof civil society organizations,particularlyin the capital,
Buenos Aires, presentcompetingprojects.While this competitionseems to be compatible with adversarialdemocracy,continuingclientelisticpracticesbetween stateagencies
and certainnongovernmentalorganizations,as well as a significantprotestsector,also
It is also supportedby particularisticandprotest-based
supportdelegativedemocracy.72
issue framing.However,some civil society organizationsare trying to organizemore
deliberatively.Drawingon the conceptslegitimizedby humanrightsgroupsunderdictatorship,manygroupsuse a rights-basedframefor theirdemands.73
Human rights groups seek to establish a politics of accountability by drawing
attention to and prosecuting past and present violations. The Center for Legal and
Social Studies (CELS) focuses on the legal aspects of human rights documentation
and defense and won the case against impunity in March. The latest generation of
family groups is H.I.J.O.S.("children"),formed by the children of the disappeared.
This group holds public "outings" (escraches) of human rights abusers, targeting
those as prominent as the president's brother-in-law.74Other family organizations
include Active Memory, started by the family members of the victims of the yet
unresolved 1994 bombing of the AMIA, a prominentJewish center in Buenos Aires,
and the Commission of the Family Members of the Defenseless Victims of Social
Violence, formed in response to police brutalityand repression.
35
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Spontaneousprotest in the last decade has been directedagainst the severe impact
of neoliberal economic restructuringon the population.75The economy is in recession. External debt has more than doubled in the past ten years, and exports have
been cut in half.76From 2000 to 2001 alone unemploymentincreased from 15.4 to
16 percent; 18 percent of the country in 2001 was living below the poverty line.77
The economic crisis has sparkedpuebladas, in which a whole city (pueblo)eruptsin
protest, including the takeover and burning of public buildings and blockading of
major roads.78Unemployedpiqueteros have coordinatednationwide roadblocksand
with the support of leftist parties and certain unions joined in general strikesunder
the uniting frame of opposition to state austeritymeasures.79
The nongovernmentalorganizationsector in urbandevelopmentand social services
has expandedto make up for statedownsizing.80This sectorhas spawnedorganizations
promotingstate-market-civilsociety linkage. For example, the umbrellaSocial Sector
Forumwas establishedin 1996 to representthe so-calledthirdsector(volunteer,charity,
andnonprofitorganizations).The Forumseeks thirdsectorparticipationin publicpolicy
formation and involvement in the distribution of multilateral loans.81Conscience
Association, a citizen educationgroup startedby the presidentof the Forum,also has
connectionsto governmentofficials, churchleaders,andbusiness.82
This trend towards the privatizationof civil society is affirmed by the business
sponsorship sought by particular groups. For example, the Fifth Argentine
Conference of the Social Sector (June26, 1999), underwrittenby variousbusinesses,
was focused on "assuringthe futureof our organizations."Some conferencetraining
was oriented at helping organizationsmake strategiclinks with businesses as well as
foundations and government.Domingo Cavallo, the finance minister,was a closing
speaker. He advocated a civil society free from state regulation, comparableto the
free market.However,as faith in the free marketdeclines with the growing economic crisis, interestin "private"collaborationmay also be waning.
Othermobilizing structures,sometimeswith reach into government,seek to coordinate the efforts of smaller community organizations.83 For example, the
InterinstitutionalCommunityResources Network of Buenos Aires began in the late
1980s to coordinatework of the state and civil society organizationsfocused on the
urbanpoor. In May 2000 it held the FirstLatinAmericanConferenceof Networksof
the Third Millenium: Public-Private-Third
Sector. Although the networkdeliberately
used third sector language to legitimateits grass-rootsfocus, representativeshave felt
marginalizedby the largernetworks'access to stateand internationalresources.84
Conclusion
The changes in civil society over the last two decades are substantialenough to call
them a third major transitionin recent Latin American history. Democratizationand
36
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economic reform, as well as international financial institutions and foundations,
have providedincentives for the transformationof social movements into nongovernmental organizations.Nongovernmentalorganizationscan more consistently interact
with democratic institutions, take on duties from a retrenchedstate, and fulfill the
requirementsof external donors. Nonetheless, social movements continue to be an
importantpart of civil society, especially in reaction to incomplete democratization
and the impact of economic transformation.
The impact of this third transition on the quality of democracy is not direct but
rather is mediated by the larger representationalregimes into which civil society
organizationsfit. The representationalregime in Brazil since 1985 has been oriented
towardmore institutionalizedalternatives.Both state actors and civil society organizations have worked to create deliberativespaces and regular opportunitiesfor participation of civil society organizations.Few political systems have such extensive
and regularizedparticipationby civil society organizations.It is unclear whether the
resultingrepresentationalregime is a cooptive form of democracythat works primarily to consolidate state control or a deliberative democracy that gives new actors a
more equitable role in politics. The final representationalregime of contemporary
Brazil is likely to depend on the outcome of intense struggles between state and society over exactly this issue. Both the mobilizing structuresof periodically cooperative
nongovernmental organizations and social movements and the citizenship frame,
which continues to drawattentionto both the sucesses and the gaps in achieving citizenship, indicate that, at least among civil society organizations,deliberativedemocracy is thriving.
The representationalregime in Argentina presents a complex picture, with an
overall openness compromisedby inconsistent state action. The political opportunities for Argentine civil society organizationsseem to vary by branch of government.
Executive action (or inaction) is consistent with adversarialand delegative democracy. Legislative attemptsto regulate the formation of civil society organizationsmay
indicate cooptive democracy.But the judiciary'srecent action supportingthe work of
human rights groups indicates that there is a move towards dialogue between state
actors and civil society organizations.85Mobilizing structurespredominantlysuggest
adversarialand delegative democracy.A variety of organizations seek to represent
their competing goals. In addition, a strong protest sector representingthose most
excluded by new economic models is increasingly active. But some organizations,
from CELS to the new community networks, are trying to foment horizontal linkages within civil society. Finally, framing efforts are those of delegative democracy;
issue-specific frames are combined with an antiausterity/state reform frame.
However, the groups focused on rights-based claims are participatingin a deliberative democracyframingprocess.
The usefulnessof the conceptof representational
regimes is apparentin this comparative study.Comparativelyhigh levels of societal control and institutionalizationindi37
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cate that Brazil has some tendencies towards a deliberativerepresentationalregime.
However,as in Argentina,the amountof statecontrolin organizingsociety continuesto
be at issue. Argentina'slower levels of societal controland institutionalization
indicate
that, with certainsectoralexceptions,it tends more towardsa delegativeor adversarial
regime, pointing to a lack of democraticconsolidationwithin the civil society arena.
But the very lack of institutionalizationof state control may provide some room for
societal maneuverin the future.Particularlybecause of the history of state controlin
both countries,institutionalizationin and of itself is not an absolutepoliticalgood but
must be weightedby its impacton all actorsin a democracy.
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